Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

Elsa H. Nixdorf v. N. Frederick Hicken and A. James
McAllister : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant: Edward M. Garrett;
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents: John H. Snow;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nixdorf v. Hicken, No. 16151 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1492

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELSA H. NIXDORF,
Plaintiff,
No. 16151

VS

N. FREDERICK HICKEN and
A. JAMES McALLISTER,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment of Third District
Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge

Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents:

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant:

John H. Snow
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Edward M. Garrett
144 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELSA H. NIXDORF,
Plaintiff,
No. 16151

VS

N. FREDERICK HICKEN and
A. JAMES MeAL LISTER,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment of Third District
Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge

Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents:

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant:

John H. Snow
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Edward M. Garrett
144 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

84102

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD INTRODUCED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO INVOKE
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR

10

POINT II:
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED
BECAUSE EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH NEGLIGENCE
WHERE A SURGEON LEAVES SURGICAL
INSTRUMENTS IN THE OPERATING SITE

16

POINT III:
A SURGEON HAS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
TO A PATIENT THAT HE LEFT A FOREIGN
OBJECT IN THE PATIENT'S BODY AND
HIS FAILURE TO SO INFORM GIVES RISE
TO AN ACTIONABLE WRONG
CONCLUSION

24
30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.i.

CASES CITED
Page
Fred rick son v Maw
119 Utah 385, 227 P2d 772

16, 17

Huggins v Hicken
6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P2d 523

16

Lund v Phillips Petroleum Company
10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P2d 952

11

Madis v Stellwagen
38 Wash. 2d 1, 227 P2d 445

21

l\lalmstrom v Olsen
16 Utah 2d 316, 400 P2d 209

17

Moore v Jones
5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P2d 222

10

Morrison v Acton
68 Ariz. 27, 198 P2d 590

27

Mudd v Dorr
579 P2d 97, (Colo. App. 1977)

22

Reinhold v Spencer
53 Idaho 688, 26 P2d 796

2l

Sanone v J. C. Penney Company
17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P2d 248

ll

Schoendorff v Society of New York Hospital
211 N.Y. 125, 105N.E. 92

27

Smith v Zeagler
157 So. 328, (Fla. 1934)

27

Talbot v Dr. W. H. Groves, Latter-Day Saints Hospital
21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P2d 872

ll

Tavlor v Milton
353 Mich. 421, 92 N.W. 2d 57

25

Tramutola v Bartone
ll8N.J. Super. 503, 288A2d 863

26

Wightman v Mountain Fuel Supply Co.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
11, 12
5 Utah
Zd Services
373, and302
P2d Act,
471administered by the Utah State Library.
Library
Technology
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. ii.

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

Malpractice -- Liability of Physician, Surgecn,
Anesthetist, or Dentist
10 ALR3d 9

16, 28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0

iii.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EXSA H. NIXDORF,
Plaintiff,
No. 16151

VS

N. FREDERICK HICKEN and
A. JAMES McALLISTER,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a medical malpractice action brought by the appellant,
Elsa H. Nixdorf. against Drs. N. Frederick Hicken and A. James
McAllister, tried before a jury on October 18 and 19, 1978.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the close of the plaintiff's case the lower court granted
defendants' motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and entered judgment thereon.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment in favor of the
defendants anc for a new trial.
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STATEfi1ENT OF FACTS
Elsa H. Nixdorf, the plaintiff, was born June 29, 1904 in
Russia.

As a small child she moved to Germany (Tr. 132) where she
At the age of 21 she emigrated to the United

received her schooling.
States.

(Tr. 132-133)

She resided 1n Salt Lake City for six or seven

years before moving to Canada where she married and had five children.
(Tr. 133-134)

After he1- husband died and her children were grown,

Mrs. Nixdorf returned to Salt Lake City and worked as a cleaning lady
first at LDS Hospital and then at Wasatch Junior High School. (Tr. 135)
From approximately 1954 to 1954, Mrs. N1xdorf suffered from
a cystocele and rectocele.

Each of these terms refers to a condition

where the pelvic d1aphram that normally holds the bladder, rectum and
uterus up in the abdominal cavity, ruptures and allows these organs to
slip out of the abdominal cavity.

In some instances, the bladder and

rectum fall down so far that they protrude from the vaginal opemng
and hang between the woman's legs.

Mrs. Nixdorf was such a case.

When first seen by Dr. Hicken, the plamtiff would actually sit on her
rectum and bladder when she sat down.

The terms "cystocele" and

"rectocele" refer to the bladder and rectum, respectively, protruding
from the abdominal cavity.
Initially, Dr. Hicken discussed w1th Mrs. Nixdorf the fact
that she needed a hysterectomy.

This appears on her office chart
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on June 2, 1964.
a hysterectomy.

( Tr. 36)

However, the plaintiff did not receive

During the course of the operation which occurred

on June 5, 1964 at the LDS Hospital, Dr. Hicken elected not to perform a hysterectomy but to repair the cystocele and rectocele and
partially amputate the cervix.
The procedure choosen by Dr. Hicken for this operation
was to place the plaintiff in a position so that gravity would pull the
organs back into the abdominal cavity through the tear in the pelvic
diaphram.
birth.)

(This is the same position a woman assumes when giving
(Tr. 31)

At that point, the surgeon, working through the

vaginal opening, would place the organ where it belonged and sew
the torn diaphram together holding the errant organ in place.
The procedure on the cystocele went smoothly.

It was

completed without complication and repair of the rectocele was begun.
After the rectum had been placed in position and while the tear in the
diaphram was being sewn together, one of the needles being used to
suture came out of the needle holder.

Dr. Hicken admitted at the

trial that the needle holder exerts a very powerful grip on the needle,
so powerful in fact that he could not take the needle out of the
needleholder by exerting pressure.

(Tr. 120)

The Record of

Surgical Operation, pages 14 and 15, plaintiff's Exhibit "l", reported
the loss as follows:
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"A small curved cutting needle was broken
while repairing the rectocele and is apparently
lying in the levator ani or the guluteus muscle
or fascia on the left side. Time was spent
to palpate in an attempt to find the needle
and, but this was never found."
At trial, Dr. Hicken admitted that in fact no needle was broken during
the operation and that an entire needle was left in the operating site.
(Tr. 107-108)
The plaintiff had no knowledge that a cutting needle had been
left in her body until she consulted Dr. Robert K. Maddock of this
city complaining of abdominal pain.

In the course of examination and

treatment, Dr. Maddock ordered x-rays of the lower abdorr.en of plaintiff
and on August 12, 1976, identified a curved cutting needle.

Dr.

Maddock testified that based on a pelvic examination he performed on the
plaintiff, and as corroborated by a radiological report by Dr. G. N.
Baldwin, it was medically probable that the needle was between the
vagina and the rectum.

(Tr. 71, 76, 77)

Dr. Hicken testified at trial, again contrary to what was entered
on the surgical report, that he knew where the needle was -- in the
wall between the rectum and the vagina.

(Tr. lll)

During the course

of the operation and at the time Dr. Hicken knew that a needle had
been left in the body of plaintiff, there was x-ray equipment available
to him that would have identified the position of the needle.
chose

Dr. Hicken

not to x-ray the site because the x-ray equipment would have

had to have been brought to the operating room and because he "knew
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that a needle left in this particular area was not particularly harmful to the patient."

Dr. Hicken testified, however, that this was a

sharp, pointed surgical cutting needle left in an area where he did
not feel it safe to palpate because of a number of sensitive organs
in this vicinity.

Dr. Hicken also testified that the needle was in-

bedded in muscle, which tends to expand and contract and as it
did so, the point would come in contact with nerves and small blood
vessels and cause pain.
Dr. Hicken rationalized his decision not to inform plaintiff
of the needle left in her body on the grounds that it would be a
source of irritation and worry and because it might elevate her
blood pressure.

(Tr. 118) ·Also, Dr. Hicken never told any of the

plaintiff's relatives about the condition and did not inform his partner
Dr. A. James McAllister.

As time passed, Dr. Hicken retired and

Dr. McAllister continued to see the plaintiff.

She complained of lower

abdominal pain which Dr. McAllister diagnosed as a "kidney stone".
(Tr. 127)

She did have high blood pressure, but it was successfully

treated by Dr. McAllister.
Mrs. Nixdorf experienced continuous lower abdominal pain
after the needle was left in her.
McAllister.

She reported this condition to Dr.

Interestingly, a copy of the surgical note from the record

of the LOS Hospital indicating the lost needle is in the office chart of
Hicken and McAllister.

However, Dr. McAllister was not aware of the
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fact that a needle had been left in the abdomen of Mrs. Nixdorf until
legal procedures were commenced.

How a doctor can propose to treat

a patient without knowing what the office file contains is most puzzling.
As indicated above, the first time that Mrs. Nixdorf or anyone else learned of the needle in her abdomen was in August, 1976
when Dr. Robert K. Maddock was notified by the x-ray specialist
that a foreign body had shown up on x-rays of the plaintiff.

Dr.

Maddock testified at trial:
"I called her (the plaintiff's daughter) on the
telephone to report the finding because this
is a pretty much standard procedure. When
you have an abnormal x-ray of any kind or an
abnormal test which is of some significance,
you should let the patient know immediately."
(Tr. 70)
The above testimony is very significant and will be discussed
in more detail under the points of argument concerning a physician's
duty to disclose.

To this point the facts have shown that the plaintiff was operated upon and that during the course of the operation a needle was left
in her abdomen.

She had no knowledge of this foreign object unt1l

August of 1976 -- twelve years after the event.

During these years

she suffered accute pain and distress and had no idea what was causing
the condition.
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Mrs. Nixdorf testified that after the operation, "I didn't-! didn't feel very good.

me.

Always bothered me.

I didn't feel very good.

It wasn't-- I was-- I got everything

taken out but I didn't feel good.
(Tr. 137)

It always bothered

I always didn't feel good."

The pain was on the left side (Tr. 140) in the groin area

and came and went and was worse when she had to work.
She also suffered from back pain.

(Tr. 140)

(Tr.l38)

The plaintiff testified

that she suffered excruciating pain when she underwent the pelvic
examination by Dr. Maddock at Holy Cross Hospital operating room.
The pain is particularly severe when she travels by car.
A.

Once I went to Canada when I stopped working.

Q.

Now, this was after the operation, wasn't it?

A.

Yah, Uh-huh.

Q.

And after you had -- and after you had quit work?

A.

Yah, we went to Canada.

Q.

And what happened?

A.

Oh, I hardly made it.

They had to stop the car.

went outside and stood for awhile and I-- well, then I felt a little
better but then I couldn't stand there forever so I had to go in
the car again and, my, did I have a trip.

When we came back it was

the worst.
Q.

Were you in pain?

A.

Oh, v hat a pain.

Q.

Where?
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·;;~s

sc painful.

Oh,

:T(/,

did I pain and r.o·:; si:-tce I

r-.e~-'e~

·::c.nteG to

dri·1e mth the car for far.

A little blt here upto·;;n I gc ·mth ;.;1· C:c.ughter

but I ·,;ould rathe: ·naH:.

aJ<;;ays v;c.lk.

0.

Can you ·nalk dovmto·nn?

A.

I ::e:k :l·:c:mtO'IIn.

everything walking.

I pay my bills.

Walk dov:ntov;n.

I do

don't like to drive m a car because it bothers me.

Q.

Is 1t th<O sitting down and the motion that causes the

A.

Yeah, the move -- when the car

pain?

moves, you know, it

rno•1es my everything, my whole body, and that needle sits right here.
I can feel it.

It starts sticking-- sticking in me."

( Tr. 144-145)

The every day chore of housework is painful to the plaintiff:
"Q.

Are you able to take care of your apartment by your-

self?
A.

Yeah, I do.

Well, I have nobody that comes in there.

I'm alone and it stays clean and I do it when I-- when I feel like and
the I take lots of Anacins and asprins to kill the pain.
Q.

And when you do the cleaning in your apartment, does

that cause you to have pain?
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A.

You mean if I--

Q.

When you move around doing your housework, does

that cause you any pain?
A.

If I watch it now -- if I don't move my body, I can

move around but if I move around here that part moves, too.
feel it right away.
down now.
moves.

got it down now.

This was up.

I can feel it.

don't know what it was.

The needle is a little bit

It's down again.

I can feel it when it

Oh, my, it's sure pain.

That pain's awful and

See, if they at least would have told me,

could take care of myself better but nobC>d:· said anything.
it.

I can

Notod:/ told me what I had."

Thc:t's

(Tr. 146-147)

The needle was lost in the thin wall between the rectum and
vagina

(Tr. 111) and to a medical probability that is where it lies now.

( T r. 76- 77)
fied:

On the subject of pain in this area, Dr. McAllister testi-

"On the cervix of the uterus we can burn that cervix and

cauterize ulcers, remove polyps without anesthetic without pain but
one certainly better not touch the wall of the vagina with that hot
needle or we will be picking her off of the chandeliers."

( Tr. 130)

The court below directed a verdict against -laintiff at the
close of plaintiff's case.

The lower court seemed to be overwhelmed

with the concept that the plaintiff in every malpractice case must proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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duce an expert witness to testify that the offending health care provider violated the standard of care in the community.
ceptions to that rule.

There are ex-

One exception is where a surgeon leaves foreign

objects in the body of a patient.
points I and II which follow.

This concept will be explored under

Additionally, this Court will be requested

to rule on a matter of first impression and that is the duty of a surgeon to disclose to a patient that he left a foreign object in the patient's
body.

The failure to disclose being actionable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT I!VlPROPERLY GRANTED
DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD INTRODUCED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO INVOKE
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.

Since on a motion for a directed verdict the court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is made and res ipsa loquitur raises an inference of
negligence, a court mc.y not properly grant a directed verdict against
the party who has validly invoked the doctrine.

This Court so stated

in the case of Moore v James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P2d 221. (1956).
"The rule, where applicable, gives rise to an inference of
negligence which carries the plaintiff's case past non-suit.
The trial court must determine the applicability of the rule
at the close of the plaintiff's case, where the sufficiency
of the evidence is challenged by a motion for non-suit.
If, at the time the evidence eliminates the plaintiff as
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the responsible cause of the accident, and if the
other requirements of the rule are satisfied, the
court must deny the motion for non-suit and the
rule applies." 297 P2d at 224.

Accord, Sanone v J. C. Penney Co., 17 Utah 2d 46,
404 P2d at 248 (1965); and Lund v Phillips Petroleum Company, 10
Utah 2d 276, 351 P2d 952 ( 1960).
The elements of res ipsa loquitur in an ordinary negligence
case, are these:
" ( 1) That the accident was of a kind which in
the ordinary course of events would not have
happened had due care been observed;
( 2) That it happened irrespective of any participation by plaintiff; and
( 3) That the cause thereof was something under
the management or control of the defendant, or
for which it is responsible."
Wightman v Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d
373, 302 P2d 471 ( 1956)
The doctrine may be applied in a medical malpractice case.
Talbot v Dr. W. H. Groves, Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d
73, 440 P2d 872, ( 1968)
"Our examination of the decisions of this court
would indicate that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has not been applied in a malpractice
case of this nature in this jurisdiction. However,
prior decisions do not indicate that the doctrine
has no ,application in this type of case, and we
are of the opinion that if there is sufficient
evidentiary foundation the doctrine should be
applied."
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A:

PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENTIARY BASIS WAS SUFFICIENT
TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE.

The first element of res ipsa loquitur

set out in Wightman,

supra., is that the accident probably would not have occurred without
negligence.

Plamtiff introduced evidence at trial to establish the fact

that the needle would not have gotten out of the needleholder in the
place it did without negligence.
Plaintiff's Exhibit "9", a curved needle holder, which Dr.
Hicken agreed was the type used during the operation on Mrs. Nixdorf was admitted into evidence.

(Tr. 49)

Also admitted were de-

fendants' Exhibit "10" and plaintJff's Exhibit "8" which are curved cutting
needles which Dr. Hicken agreed were similar to the ones used on
Nixdorf.

~lrs.

(Tr. 52 and Tr. 97, respectively.)
A needleholder can best be d1scribed in common parlance as

a long- handled scissor-like device with a rachet-like device near the
scissor grips to hold the needle secure when the rachet is engaged.
When the rachet

JS

engaged, it exerts a vice-lii:e grip on the needle.

Dr. Hicken agreed that when the needle and needleholder are handed to
him during an operation, they are clean, dry and sterile.

(Tr. 120)

At the trial, in front of the jury, Dr. Hicken was presented with a
needle locked in the needleholder.

He agreed that the needleholdcr

exerted a very pov;erful grip on the needle and stated: "In fact, I
can't take it out of there by exerting pressure."

It was a proven

fact to anyone in the courtroom that the needle could not pull out of
the needle holder when the rachet was engaged.

Since Exhibits "8",
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"9" and "10" have been included in the record on appeal, the members of this Court are urged to satisfy themselves in that regard.
Dr. Hicken testified that when he removed the needleholder from Mrs. Nixdorf's body and discovered the needle wasn't
in it any longer, he assumed that the needle had broken.

(Tr. 108)

Had he taken the precaution of having the site x-rayed, he would
have known otherwise.

At the time of trial, Dr. Hicken agreed that

in fact the needle was not broken, ( Tr. 107) and that he did not
know how the needle got out of the holder.

( Tr. 98- 99)

The doctor

also agreed that it was uncommon to leave objects inside a patient's
abdomen.

(Tr. 113)
The standard procedure in suturing is to insert the needle

and suture through the flesh with the needleholder until the tip can
be grasped by a forceps and the needle and suture pulled through
the tissue.

Further, the standard procedure is to have the needle

either in the holder or in the forceps at all times.
other than that violates the standard.

Any procedure

This inference is clearly drawn

from the testimony of Dr. Hicken on page 99 of the transcript:
"Q.

You are the one that held that needle holder at the

time, were you not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were using it to suture interior tissue in her

body?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And you indicated that it could have gotten away simply

by slipping out, it that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Or it could have come out had the ratchet been disen-

gaged by you?
A.

It could.

Q.

Yes.

And in either event. that needle at that time was

free and not mechanically held by you, is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

But the standard procedure is to have that needle either

in the holder or in a -- what did you call that other instrument?
A.

Forcep.

Q.

Forcepped alternately, is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So that if the forcep is holding it then you release

the ratchet on the needleholder and pull it all the way through and
start fresh again with a new one because you take that needle right
out, don't you?
A.

Yes."

It is clear from the evidence that the needle was released from
the needle holder before Dr. Hicken could grasp it firmly with the forceps and complete the suturing process.

How the needle got loose is
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not known.

However, in view of the fact that a needleholder exerts

a vice-like grip on the needle, the jury could well have found that
the logical inference is that Dr. Hicken released the ratchet on the
needleholder prior to the time that the tip of the needle was at a
place where it could be grasped with the forceps and pulled through
the tissue.

The medical standard as testified to by Dr. Hicken is

that the needle should either be in the needleholder or forceps at
all times.

From the fact that the needle was released prematurely,

the jury could find, indeed should find that Dr. Hicken was guilty
of negligence.

The only explanation offered by Dr. Hicken was that

the needle and needleholder once inside the body are surrounded by
blood, fats and oils and that may cause the needle to slip loose.
However, when it is remembered that the needle and needleholder are
handed to him sterile and dry and that it is virtually impossible to
pull the needle from the needleholder when the ratchet is engaged,
that explanation is unlikely.

Furthermore, he did not know how the

needle got out of the holder and testified that it could have simply
slipped out; or it could have come out if the ratchet had been disengaged by him.
The most likely explanation is that he, like all surgeons,
move rapidly; suturing becomes somewhat mechanical and is done by
habit; and on this particular occasion he released the ratchet before
grasping the needle with the forceps .
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The evidence presented a jury question under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.

POINT II:

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
WAS Ifi1PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE EXPERT
TESTIMONY IS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH
NEGLIGENCE WHERE A SURGEON LEAVES SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE OPERATING SITE.

Although the general rule is that expert testimony is needed
to establish the standard of care in the medical malpractice case,
Huggins v Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P2d 523, the number of cases
holding that expert testimony is not necessary to establish a standard
of care where a doctor leaves foreign objects inside a patient are legion.
See Annotation, 10 ALR3d 9, Malpractice:

Liability of Physician, Sur-

geon, Anesthetist, or Dentist for injury resulting from foreign objects
left in patient.
This Court recognized that exception to the general rule in
Fredrickson v Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P2d 772, where the defendant
surgeon left a sponge in a patient 'Nhich caused her pain and discomfort for approximately three years.

Speaking for a unanimous court

Justice Latimer said:
"So far as establishing negligence on the part of
the doctor in this type of case is concerned, it
would appear to be a matter of common knowledge
that due care is lacking if the surgical instruments,
sponges or medical supplies are not removed before
an incision is closed or the wound heals; ... "
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Chief Justice Henroid in his dissenting opinion in Maimstrom v Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316, 400 P2d 209, puts the matter very
poignantly:
"In that case, (Frederickson, supra.) of course, including the lowly midwife, anyone would conclude
that leaving flotsam and jetsam in the sewed-up
innards of a trusting patient would not merit a
kudos at the medical college. Not even a flunked
pre-med student would or could attest to the proposition that expert testimony would be necessary
to conclude that leaving sponges and knives and
other sundry nick-nacks in the throat, or elsewhere,
was not standard chiropractice (sic) in the community."
Notwithstanding this overwhelming weight of authority
both from Utah and other jurisdictions, the trial court granted
defendants' motion for a directed verdict evidently because plaintiff
had not produced an expert witness to testify that it was contrary
to the medical standard of care to leave surgical instruments in the
abdomen of Mrs. Nixdorf.
The lower court missed the legal thesis of plaintiff's
case and the rationale of the many cases on this point.

The negli-

gence is the act of allowing the surgical instrument or other paraphernalia to become lost, miscounted or whatever.

Once that fact is

established, as it was in this case, the doctrine of Fredrickson v Maw,
supra., applies.

Prima facie evidence of negligence is established and

the final result is the function of the jury.

The testimony of medical

experts at that point could only be in mitigat10n of the problem and
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not to establish or refute negligence.
Dr. Hicken testified on the subject, but his testimony was
not helpful to him.

Knowing the needle had been lost by him, Dr.

Hicken palpated to see if he could find the needle.
(Tr. 110)

He could not.

An x-ray machine was available, but he chose not to use

it stating that Mrs. Nixdorf was not in the best physical condition

and the x-ray machine would have to be brought from another part
of the building.

He also testified that based on his experience needles

"left in that area were not particularly harmful to the patient."

( Tr. 110)

His overall testimony on the point, however, would indicate otherwise.
"Q.

You didn't know where the needle was, did you?

A.

Yes,

knew the definite vicinity of where it was.

Q.

If you knew where it was, why didn't you get it out?

A.

Because I didn't want to damage tissues in which it

was imbedded.
Q.

It was very close not only to the bladder but the rectum,

A.

It was in the wall between the rectum and vagina.

Q.

All right, now, that is in position where that needle could

wasn't it?

do damage, isn't it, to that organ?
A.
through."

It is in the position where it could if it would migrate

(Tr. lll)
"Q.

All right, now, that needle had taken a bite of muscle
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before you lost it, isn't that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

It was into the muscle?

Now, of course, muscles in the body are

something that expand and retract, are they not?

They move, don't

they?
A.

Yes.
If the needle was contained in the muscle, we

Q.

could expect that muscle to expand and contract, couldn't we?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And every time you press fless

(sic) across the point

of that needle it is going to come in contact with nerves, small blood
vessles and what have you, is it not?
A.

It could.

Q.

And that would produce pain, wouldn't it?

A.

If it did, it would.

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes, sir.

All right.

It is in the position certainly to do

that?
(Tr. 1!5)

Despite the concern expressed by Dr. Hicken over Mrs.
Nixdorf's ability to tolerate the procedure, the anesthesia report indicates that Mrs. Nixdorf's blook pressure and pluse did not vary
signifJcantly during the operation.
Dr. Hicken testified that it was uncommon to leave things
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in a patient's abdomen.
The statements of the doctor arc contradictory.

At one

point he says that the needle was in a place where it would not do
any harm.

He testified further that he did not palpate extensively

because c:' the damage that could be caused to tissue.

He goes into

the matter further and extensively by indicating that the needle was
in a position where it could produce pain and damage.
The evidence before the jury at the close of plaintiff's case
was that Dr. Hicken had left a needle in the plaintiff's abdomen when
he sewed her up.

There was an x-ray machine available but not used.

The instrument left !:lehind was a sharp. pointed surgical cutting needle
sandwiched between the rectum and vagina in a position to do damage
to those organs and cause pain to Mrs. Nixdorf.

The testimony of

Mrs. Nixdorf is that the needle was and still is extremely painful.
Virtually every court in the natwn, including this one, has sa1d that
those are facts from which laymen are competent to infer a lack of due
care.
The lower court in this case seemed to fashion a new rule
wh1ch in effect says that if a surgeon admits that he leaves hardware
in the body of a patient, no jury question is presented unless an expert testifies that he violated the standard of care for not getting the
hardware out of the body.

Such a rule is illogical and has no support.
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The correct rule is stated in the case of Reinhold v
Spencer, 53 Idaho 688, 26 P2d 796.

In this case the defendant

surgeon broke a needle off in the plaintiff's chest while tapping
the plaintiff's lungs.

The defendant appealed from a verdict for

the plaintiff partly on the ground that a non-suit should have been
granted him because there was no expert evidence to establish that
he had been negligent.

The court, after review of the facts, dis-

agreed and said:

"It has been variously held that a surgeon's failure
to remove a foreign object, such as a sponge,
gauze pad, part of an instrument, etc. is negligence per se, necessarily negligence, and negligence, and in all events it is uniformly held that
the failure to remove such foreign object is evidence of negligence and sufficient for submission
to the jury without the aid of expert testimony."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court of Washington reached a similar result
in Madis v Stellwagen, 38 Wash. 2d 1, 227 P2d 445.

During the

course of an operation on one of the eyes of the plaintiff, the
defendant surgeon inserted a number of metalic needles each one
threaded with black silk.

When the operation was finished the needles

were removed, but one of the needles remained in the eye.
was made of an x-ray to aid in discovering the needle.

No use

Later, x-ray

equipment located -,he needle and it was removed.
The surgeon was charged with negligently leaving a needle
used in the operation in appellant's eye, and also in failing to remove
the needle.

The court ruled:
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"When it was made to appear that the needle had been
left in appellant's eye, and that by use of the x-ray
its presence and locatiOn later became known, the jury
would have had the right to infer that if the x-ray had
been used before the operation was closed the presence
of the needle would have been discovered and could
have been removed."
"We have considered the theory of respondent as outlined in his statement of question involved and in his
brief to the effect that a case for the jury was not
made out when it appeared that the respondent closed
the operation knowning that a needle was missing, and,
believing that it was either in the eye or in the orbit,
made a search for such needle until in his professional
judgment further search would endanger the safety of
the patJent. The theory is not tenable in view of the
inference which may be drawn from the failure of respondent before closing the operation to use x-ray
equipment in an effort to locate the needle in the eye.
It was the duty of respondent when he either knew
or had good reason to believe that the missing needle
was or might be in the eye, to use available methods
known to his profession to locate the missing needle."
The evidence in the case at bar is that the doctor although
knowing where the needle had been left, did very little to locate and
remove the same and did not use the x-ray equipment that could
have been made available.
The Colorado case of l'vludd v Dorr. 57 4 P2d 97, (Colo. App.
1977) is in all respects like this case.

In the Colorado case the sur-

geon left a cottonoid sponge in the patient.

Action was instituted on

two grounds, namely the surgeon's failure to inform the patient of the
risks involved and negligence in leaving the sponge in her body.
The lower court directed a verdict in the defendant's favor on the
negligence claim, but submitted the informed consent issue to the
jury
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The appeals court ruled that where a foreign object is
lost in a patient, a prima facie case of negligence is made out and
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies and since the evidence
established all requisite conditions, it was error for the lower court
to direct a verdict because of plaintiff's failure to present expert
testimony.
The court stated, in part, as follows:
"Dr. Dorr argues, however, that when he discovered that the cottonoid sponge was missing, he
acted reasonably and in conformity with community
medical standards in searching for it. He asserts
that the trial court correctly concluded that his
abandoning that search was based on h1s medical
judgment, a matter not within the jury's competence,
and that Mrs. Mudd's condition at the time was
such that any prudent surgeon would have closed
the incision.
"However exhaustive Dr. Dorr's search after discovery of the sponge's disappearance, and however exemplary his decision to close without its
retrieval, the fact remains that when Mrs. Mudd
left his care, a sponge remained within her body.
The measures taken by Dr. Dorr and his surgical
team after losing the cottonoid sponge in no way
obviate the doctor's failure initially to take precautions sufficient to prevent the loss.
Accordingly, since the evidence in this case established all requisite conditions, the trial court's
refusal to instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and its direction of a verdict for defendant
because of plaintiff's failure to present expert
testimony was error."
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From the above review of the evidence and the applicable
case law, it is clear that the trial court committed reversible error
in directing a verdict against plaintiff

POii;T III:

o

A SURGEON HAS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
TO A PATIENT THAT HE LEFT A FOREIGN
OBJECT IN THE PATIENT'S BODY AND
HIS F AlLURE TO SO INFORM GIVES RISE
TO AN ACTIONABLE WRONG
0

The trial court refused to submit to the jury as an issue
of actionable wrong the failure of the surgeon to inform plamtiff that
he had left a needle in her body

0

We may assume that the court did

so on the ground that plaintiff did not produce a medical expert who
would testify that the surgeon had violated a standard of care in
failing to inform the plaintiff.
This question is a matter of first impression before the
Utah Supreme Court and the decision will have a far reaching effect

0

This Court can go forward and say that a person has a right to know

if hardware is left behind in the body by the surgeon and concealment
of that fact may go to a ju:-

without expert testimony or the Court
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can decide that a doctor is not liable for concealing the fact that
he left a needle in the body of a patient unless another doctor will
testify that a standard of care was violated.

To adopt the latter

point of view will place this state in the dark ages of medical malpractice.

This rule will allow a negligent doctor to conceal the

fact of the mistake simply by saying that in his judgment the patient
should not be told and then stand behind the shield of some fanciful
"standard of care" fashioned by his medical colleagues to the effect
that if he merely erred in his judgment he would not be guilty of
malpractice because no one can question judgmental decisions of a
doctor.

This particular bit of forensic jargon has served to protect

the medical profession from its mistakes for too long.

There may have

been a time in history when people were child-like, uneducated, unsophisticated and superstitious concerning the healing arts and what
was happening within their body.

That time has long since passed.

A person has an absolute right to be informed by a doctor when a
medical error has been made and particularly has a right to know
when a surgeon leaves surgical instruments in his body.

The sur-

geon has an absolute duty to disclose that fact to a patient.
tion plays no role in a matter such as this.

Discre-

This principle which the

Court must adopt is soundly supported by cases from other jurisdictions.
InthecaseofTaylorvMilton, 353Mich. 421. 92N.W. 2d
57, ( 1958) plaintiff sued the defendant physician who failed to disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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close to the patient that a filiform had broken off a cateter the defendant had inserted in the patient's urethra.

The defendant doctor

appealed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

One error urged by

the defendant doctor was that the court did not require expert testi-

many.

The appeals court quoting the lower court's instruction stated

and held as follows:
'"I charge you that there is no question in skill or
judgment, no question of practice beyond the knowlege of laymen, because you are only considering
the one question: did he or did he not conceal the
presence of this filiform in the bladder of this plaintiff.' This statement finds square support in LeFaive
v Asselin, 262 fvlich. 443, 247 N. W. 911. We are concerned here with a broken needle-like steel-capped
object some 12 inches long admittedly left in the
man's bladder. To borrow Mr. Justice Wiest's much
quoted phrase in Ballance v Dunnington, 241 1\lich.
383, 387, 217 N.W. 329, 52 A.L.R. 262 even the
"merest tyro" might know that a doctor's concealment
of such a state of affairs from a patient was imp roper."
Finding no error, the court affirmed.
In Tramutola v Bartone, 118 N.J. Super. 503, 288 A2d
863.

The plaintiff had undergone surgery on her right lung in 1960

and afterward complained of a sharp pain in her chest.

During the

operation a needle had broken off above her right breast.

Although

the needle was clearly apparent in x-rays taken after surgery, and
for four years thereafter. neither the surgeon who performed the
operation nor her attending physician informed the plaintiff of the
presence of the needle in her body.
A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal.

One of

the c;rrors assigned by the defendant doctors was that there was no
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expert testimony to the effect that they had a duty to disclose
to the patient that a needle had been left in her body.

Answering

this contention the court stated:
"The negligence charged against Dr. Elwood in
this case was his failure to disclose to plaintiff
that a foreign object was left in her body during
the operation performed by Dr. Bartone. Where
a surgeon knows or has reason to believe that
he left a foreign object in his patient's body
during an operation, he has a duty to disclose
the facts to his patient, absent any sound medical reason for not doing so."
Smith v Zeagler, 157 So. 328, (Fla. 1934)
"But, even if it had been shown that the defendant was required by the urgent necessity of the
case to leave a sponge in his patient's abdomen,
because of the dangers attendant upon delay to
further explore for it, it was the legal duty of
the physician to so inform his patient within a
reasonable time thereafter by advising her of
what he had been compelled to do, in order that
she might seek as early relief from the effects
of the foreign object left in her body, as her
condition might permit."
Schoendorf£ v Society of New York Hospital. 211 N.Y. 125,
105N.E. 92
"Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body."
In Morrison v Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P2d 590 the Arizona
Court liibled the failure to disclose to a patient the existence of a
foreign object within his body as "constructive fraud" .
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A collection of cases on this subject is set forth in 10
A .L. R. 3d tllalpractice -- Fore1gn Objects at page 37.

The Court will

note that the rule to be adopted by this Court is supported by
the majority of courts considering the subject.
It may be asked whether Dr. Hicken had a sound medical reason for not disclosing the fact that he left a needle in Mrs.
Nixdorf.

He testified that the reason he did not tell her is because

she had "linquistic difficulties, she was worried and nervous and
had high blood pressure. "

( Tr. 118)

On redirect examination he

refuted those reasons.
"Q.

No·N doctor,

you gave some reasons why you didn't

tell Mrs. Nixdorf about her needle.

One of those was that she

had high blood pressure, is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, high blood pressure is a medically treatable

disease, is it not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Then actually a person with high blood pressure

has a right to know what is going on in his or her own body, does
he not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And a person who has a linquistic difficulty, should

certainly have a right to know what is going on in his or her own
body?

Should that person not know?
A. They should.
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Q.

All right.

Now, there is alot of nervous people

in the world, alot of us are nervous, aren't we?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

I'm nervous today.

A.

Granted.

Q.

All right.

Certainly we ought to have a right to

know what is going on in our body, shouldn't we?
A.

Yes."

Yes?

(Tr. 121-122)

The foregoing testimony does not excuse Dr. Hicken from
informing plaintiff of the fact that he left a needle in her abdomen.
The Court is again reminded of the testimony of Dr. Maddock concerning the proper method and standard:
"When you have an abnormal x-ray of any kind
or an abnormal test which is of some significance,
you should let the patient know immediately."
(Tr. 70)
Certainly this testimony applies with equal force where
something goes wrong during the course of an operation.
This Court must state with certainty that when a surgeon
leaves a foreign object in the body of a patient, he must inform the
patient of that fact so that the patient can select a further course
of treatment to correct the condition, if possible.

In this case, as

in most cases where a foreign object is left in the body, the sufficiency
of reasons given for non-disclosure are questions for the jury.
otherwise will er.

To do

.e the negligent doctor to escape the consequence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. 29.

of his error by stating:

"It was my judgment not to tell the patient."

The time has come when this Court must say that in a
matter as flagrant and obvious as this, lay people on juries are
competent and intelligent enough to fairly decide the rssues between
the doctor who leaves a needle in an operatwn, fails to disclose the
fact, and the patient who must bear the consequence.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff proved all elements necessary to invoke the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, namely:
" ( l) That the accident was of a kind which, in the
ordinary course of events would not have happened
had due care been observed;
( 2) That it happened irrespective of any participation
by plaintiff; and
( 3) That the cause thereof was something under the
management or control of the defendant, or for whrch
it is responsible."

Closely akin to that doctrine is the special doctrine applied
in medical malpractice cases wherein the surgeon fails to remove a
foreign object in the body of a patient.

That is prima facie evidence
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of negligence.
by plaintiff.

Both points were satisfied by the evidence produced
The defendants produced no evidence to the contrary.

A jury question was clearly presented.
As a separate, independent ground of recovery, plaintiff
proved that the surgeon fraudulently concealed the fact that he left
a needle in the body of the plaintiff.

The failure to disclose gives

rise to a separate, independent ground of liability which presented
an issue for the jury.
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court committed
error in granting a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's
case and this action should be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.
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